Conflict Avoidance through Choice of Law and Forum by Peterson, Courtland H.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 1 Symposium - International Business 




Conflict Avoidance through Choice of Law and Forum 
Courtland H. Peterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Courtland H. Peterson, Conflict Avoidance through Choice of Law and Forum, 45 Denv. L.J. 20 (1968). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CONFLICT AVOIDANCE THROUGH CHOICE
OF LAW AND FORUM
By COURTLAND H. PETERSON*
A lawyer, when involved in the drafting of an international
contract for a client, may, in general, adopt one of two approaches.
He may, as is the custom of civil law lawyers, identify the law
which is to govern the contract, or specific provisions thereof, by
incorporating by reference an identifiable legal system. Or, if in-
clined to use the second approach as are many common law lawyers,
he may attempt to foresee any problems which might arise and
deal with them through precise provisions. Professor Peterson dis-
cusses the two approaches, the rationale that perpetuates them, and
the advantages and disadvantages of each. Although each contract
must be treated individually, Professor Peterson suggests that every
contract should include provisions specifying choice of law and
forum. Such provisions can at least minimize the uncertainty which
is necessarily involved in a contractual situation involving more than
a single legal system.
T is fundamental that basic terms in the formation of a contract -
price, quantity and quality, timing of delivery or other perform-
ance - are almost entirely economic decisions for the client to make.
The function of the lawyer with regard to drafting such terms is
therefore not so much to advise about their desirability as it is to
express them clearly and unambiguously in the contract documents.
Given an approximate equality of negotiating ability on each side
of the contract, such basic terms will reflect with fair accuracy both
market value and other bargaining strengths of the parties.
The role of the lawyer is clearly larger with respect to those
supplementary provisions of the contract which deal with the imple-
mentation of performance, interpretation, modification, termination
and enforcement. As to these matters he must advise on the wisdom
of inclusion as well as perform the mechanics of drafting. More-
over, since these provisions present legal issues, they presuppose the
applicability of a legal system against which they can be evaluated.
When several legal systems are potentially applicable, either alterna-
tively or cumulatively, the drafting problems are obviously magnified.
This is especially true where the systems in question are those of
different countries, with different legal traditions and institutions.
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A. 1951, LL.B. 1953,
University of Colorado; M. Comp. L., University of Chicago, 1959; Dr. Jur., Frei-
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In such cases the systems serving as the regulative background for
evaluation and enforcement may vary widely, not only as to spe-
cific rules but also as to the broader principles of propriety and
public policy.1 The purpose of the present article is to review some
of the important factors which bear on these magnified problems,
to alert the reader to some of the dangers of reliance on over-
simplified answers to highly complex questions, and to suggest a
common sense approach to drafting for the international transaction.
It should be noted at the outset that the contract provisions
referred to above as supplementary are, except for highly onerous
clauses, less clearly affected by market and bargaining strength than
are the basic contract terms. The consequence of this fact is that
more latitude is usually available for differences in the approach
to drafting. The lawyer therefore has greater freedom to express
his experience, prejudices and legal risk-taking propensities. This
somewhat mixed blessing is reflected in the great variation of draft-
ing philosophy between practitioners.
To the extent that generalization about drafting philosophy is
possible, however, there are two schools of thought on the subject.
One of these, which may be called the incorporation-by-reference
school, attempts to solve the problem of the applicable law by the
relatively simple adoption of an identified legal system as a matter
of contract, or by the adoption of one system to govern one defined
aspect of the agreement and one or more other systems to govern
other aspects. Such a provision may or may not be coupled with a
contractual choice of forum. This incorporation view, which is usu-
ally favored by lawyers with training or experience in the civil law
countries, results in rather simple, straight-forward documents with
a minimum of detail beyond the basic terms.2
The second approach, which may be called the legislative or
codification view, attempts to foresee as fully as possible the prob-
lems which may arise under the particular agreement and to deal
with them by fairly precise provisions in the contract itself. This
approach obviously tends in the direction of highly complex docu-
1 Diversity of legal rules is, of course, an interstate as well as an international phe-
nomenon, but substantial homogeneity of legal traditions, the growth of common
American theories about conflict of laws, and the wide adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code have all tended to dampen the effects of diversity in the interstate
sphere. Such ameliorating influences have as yet had much less impact on interna-
tional transactions.
2 See Lalive, Negotiations with American Lawyers - A Foreign Lawyer's View, in
SYMPOSIUM ON NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CON-
TRACTS, 1965, at 1, 8-18 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1966). There are, of course,
some European contracts which are traditionally detailed, but these are the exception
rather than the rule. Van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the Common-Law Lawyer, in
PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 5, 9-10 (1962).
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ments. It is the view most often favored by lawyers with common
law backgrounds.3
The broad subject of arbitration is beyond the scope of the
present inquiry, but before taking a closer look at these two drafting
approaches it should be noted that the increasing use of arbitration
in international contracts cases has an impact on drafting philosophy.
The rules and procedures under which arbitrators decide cases vary
widely, of course, depending on the terms of submission. But even
where the contract contains a choice of law clause, and especially
when it does not, arbitrators frequently feel greater latitude than
courts in the search for applicable legal rules. In some cases, as for
example where the arbitrator is designated an amiable compositeur,
almost complete discretion is left to the arbitrator. Since most arbi-
trators do feel bound, however, to follow express provisions as the
"law of the contract" whatever else may appear in the terms of
submission, contracts containing arbitration clauses are rather uni-
formly ones in which the legislative or codification approach is most
satisfactory.4
Several factors may be suggested to explain the preference of
civil law lawyers for incorporation and the inclination of common
law lawyers toward more detailed drafting. The lawyer in a civil
law country is, of course, accustomed to working with detailed codes.
Whether such codes really do contribute to greater certainty in the
judicial process is debatable, but the civil law lawyer does argue with
some justification that the individual draftsman of a contract cannot
be expected to supply the same degree of foresight or detail as has
gone into the drafting of the code.5 The conclusion then follows
logically enough that the contract draftsman should content himself
with detailed drafting only in those areas where the specific trans-
action requires adaptation; beyond that he should simply refer to
an appropriate legal system. This conclusion is reinforced by the
rather uniform willingness of courts in civil law countries to permit
party autonomy in such matters. Especially in the European coun-
3 Van Hecke, supra note 2, at 10-11; Brudno, Negotiations with Foreign Lawyers - An
American Lawyer's View, in SYMPOSIUM ON NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, 1965, at 23-39 (Southwestern Legal Foundation
1966).
4 Cf. Mezger, The Arbitrator and Private International Law, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 229, 231 (M. Domke ed. 1958). See also Lagergren, The Limits of
Party Autonomy II, in THE SOURCES OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 201 (C.
Schmitthof ed. 1964).
5 Cf. Lalive, supra note 2, at 9. Lalive's interesting discussion suggests, however, that
these differences in attitude are quite complex, involving historical and psychological
influences as well. Id. at 8-18.
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tries, civil law courts not only enforce the parties' choice of law but
also regularly defer without objection to the parties' stipulation of
a particular forum.6
The common law lawyer, on the other hand, is haunted by the
famous pronouncement of Learned Hand in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard
S. S. Co.7 In that case a bill of lading, delivered in Italy and cover-
ing a shipment from Milan to New York via Southampton, contained
both a limitation of the carrier's liability and a stipulation that the
contract was to be "governed by English law." The limitation of
liability was probably invalid under the British Carriage of Goods
Act, but Hand, holding the limitation clause valid in the absence
of proof by libelant that it was invalid under Italian law, declared:
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place;
they may of course incorporate any provisions they wish into their
agreements - a statute like anything else - and when they do,
courts will try to make sense out of the whole, so far as they can.
But an agreement is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be,
and to try to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps. Some law
must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever
to do with that; no more than with whether their acts are torts or
crimes.8
The case law,9 scholarly opinion'0 and even statutes1" have since
ameliorated the effects of this devastating attack on party autonomy
6 See Van Hecke, Choice-of-Law Provisions in European Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL
SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 44-53 (1962). There are, of course,
exceptions for particular types of matters, such as domestic relations, real property,
bankruptcy, etc., but the exceptions are not the same in all countries. Uniformity of
exception as well as of recognition of party autonomy was encouraged by the adoption
in 1963 of a Draft Convention on the General Jurisdiction of Contractual Forums by
the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The text of this Draft Convention
is reprinted in 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 160 (1964). A comparison of the recognition of
forum contracts in the United States and British Commonwealth jurisdictions with
each other and with the provisions of the Draft Convention can be found in Cowen &
Da Costa, The Contractual Forum -A Comparative Study, 43 CAN. B. REv. 453
(1965). For the situation in Latin America see Folsom, Choice-of-Law Provisions in
Latin American Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS 54-63 (1962).
7 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
8 Id. at 117.
9 One of the leading American cases is Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d
189 (2d Cir. 1955), which makes an interesting comparison with Gerli because it also
involved Cunard as defendant and was decided by the same court. See also Maw, Con-
flict Avoidance in International Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTER-
NATIONAL CONTRACTS 23-35 (1962).
10See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 467-68 (1962); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 202-03 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAws § 332a '(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) ; A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS-CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
246-50 (1965).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
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by one of our most distinguished jurists, but the enforceability of
choice of law clauses is even yet a matter of some doubt in Ameri-
can law.' 2 Of course the power to select a forum often exerts a
strong though indirect influence on the law actually to be applied
to a transaction. And it now appears clear that contractual consent
to the jurisdiction of a particular court, if coupled with actual notice,
satisfies the demands of the due process clause even if the agree-
ment is an adhesion contract.' 3  But whether the parties can confer
exclusive jurisdiction on a designated forum by contract is a matter
of even greater uncertainty than their power to choose an applicable
law.' 4 Small wonder that the American lawyer takes Hand's advice:
If you want to be sure that a particular rule is applicable, express it
specifically in the contract.
One anomaly resulting from the dubious enforceability of
choice-of-exclusive-forum clauses in American law is that in some
cases the preferences of civil and common law lawyers involved
ought to be reversed. Suppose, for example, a contract is made in
New York between American and German parties which designates
German law as applicable and German courts as exclusively com-
petent to adjudicate. The New York courts (or other United States
courts) are much more likely to ignore these provisions than a Ger-
man court would be if the designation were New York law and an
12Even Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955), discussed
in note 9 supra, expressed some doubt as to the parties' ability to stipulate the law
governing the validity of their contract, although affirming their power to designate
the law governing interpretation. 221 F.2d at 195. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 10, takes a broader view but also imposes restrictions. For an interesting
article discussing the attitudes of various United States courts toward party autonomy
and the relevant considerations that affect such attitudes, see Johnston, Party Auton-
omy in Contracts Specifying Foreign Law, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 37 (1966).
13 National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (case involv-
ing internal as opposed to international conflict of laws question).
14 In 1955 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an advance agreement on forum,
deferring to the foreign jurisdiction where this was "reasonable." Win. H. Muller &
Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955). Three years later
the Fifth Circuit declined to enforce a choice of forum clause on the ground that such
agreements to oust the jurisdiction of courts are contrary to public policy. Carbon
Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cr. 1958). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Muller, 350 U.S. 903 (1955). In Carbon Black certiorari
was granted but later dismissed as improvidently granted, on the (questionable) theory
that no conflict between circuits was presented, since Muller involved an in personam
and Carbon Black an in rem proceeding. 359 U.S. 180, 183 '(1959). Recently, how-
ever, the Second Circuit itself, sitting en banc, has resolved the question against
enforcement of such clauses by overruling Muller. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). Since this was done principally on the theory that such
clauses are forbidden by § 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46 U.S.C.
§§ 1300-15), Indussa presumably leaves the matter open as to contracts not covered
by that Act. See also Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: "Prorogation Agree-
ments," 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 414 (1961).
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American forum. Therefore, a German lawyer desiring to obtain
the benefit of some specific rule of German law would be better
advised to express it in the contract than to simply designate German
law as applicable. By the same token the lawyer on the American
side of the transaction should have less concern about the appli-
cability of German rules to a potential dispute under an omnibus
choice of German law and forum clause than he would have if the
drafting were more specific. The rather rare occurrence of this re-
versal of attitudes, one suspects, is attributable to the fact that law-
yers drafting international contracts seldom are able to foresee or
investigate the specific advantages or disadvantages which will accrue
from the choice of a particular law or forum.
However fair it may be to describe the incorporation and legis-
lative philosophies of drafting as general tendencies, several factors
operate to blur the differences in result to which a sharp distinction
between them might otherwise lead. One such factor is that the
common law lawyer, having drafted more or less exhaustively, is
likely to include a choice of law or forum clause in his boilerplate
as a backstop to his own limited foresight. An opposing factor is
at work on the civil law lawyer; if the transaction involves reference
to a common law system, he is likely to indulge in more detailed
drafting because of his own uncertainties about what the applicable
common law rule may be. Clients, of course, usually favor sim-
plicity in drafting, either through lack of understanding of the legal
complexities and risks involved, or else on the more rational ground
of a desire to keep the transaction flexible and negotiable. This is
offset to some extent by clients' normal suspicion of foreign courts
or any foreign law. The net effect of these conflicting pressures is
usually a set of contract documents falling somewhere between
simple incorporation by reference and very detailed codification, but
involving elements of both. The choice of law clause is a very
common element. Clauses consenting to jurisdiction or designating
exclusively competent forums are less frequently included, but are
by no means rare. A separate but related type of clause is frequently
used to designate the controlling text, when the contract documents
are drafted in more than one language.
There are thus four different types of clauses, with a host of
possible variations and combinations. The following are fairly
standard examples of these basic types:
(1) Choice of law: This agreement shall be construed in ac-
cordance with the laws of [name of state or country] and
1968
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the legal relations and obligations of the parties shall be
governed by said laws.1
5
(2) Consent to jurisdiction: The parties hereby consent to the
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of [name
of state or country] for the resolution of any dispute aris-
ing under this agreement.1"
(3) Exclusive forum: The parties agree that the courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction of [name of state or country] shall have
exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute
arising under this agreement.
(4) Controlling text: This agreement has been drafted in both
the [ ] and the [ ] languages. Each text
shall be valid; nevertheless, in the event of conflict in the
interpretation of the obligations of the parties, it is agreed
that the [ ] text shall be controlling. 7
All four of these clauses might well be found in the same con-
tract, in one form or another. If all four did appear in one docu-
ment then normally - but not necessarily - the first three clauses
would name one state or country and the fourth clause would desig-
nate the language of that country as controlling. In fact, however,
it is rather rare to find all four in the same contract, or even to find
all of the first three in one contract drafted in a single language.
The important point to be observed is that each of these clauses
deals with a related but separate problem of uncertainty in private
international law; the problems are separate, but because of the
relationship between them the "partial drafting" which deals with
15 Many lawyers apparently use only the first half of this clause and omit the latter part,
either on the theory that the word "construed" includes legal effect as well as inter-
pretation, or on the theory that no stipulation as to law governing validity would be
enforced anyway; see note 12 supra. But it certainly is not clear that stipulations as
to law governing validity are wholly unenforceable, and even less certain that inter-
pretation includes validity by implication. Also, the normal assumption seems to be
that the law referred to by a choice of law clause is the local law of the designated
state or country. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332a (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1960). This may be a safe assumption from the American point of view,
but there is some danger in assuming that it holds true in other countries. The leading
English case on stipulations as to governing law interpreted such a clause as adopting
the whole law, including the conflict of laws rules of the designated country. Vita
Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277. (P.C.) (n.s.). But cf.
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1955).
16 Such clauses should probably provide for adequate notice by the complaining party,
although formal service of process is not usually regarded as necessary under such a
clause. Otherwise the provision may run afoul of due process standards, and this
might be true even if actual notice were given. Compare National Equipment Rental
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 '(1964), with Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
17 See generally on such clauses de Vries, Choice of Language in International Contracts,
in PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 14-22 (1962);
Folsom, Clauses in International Contracts Involving Choice of Law, Language,
Forum, and Conflict Avoidance, in SYMPOSIUM ON NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING




some but not all of these problems may give rise to some unexpected
results.
Consider, for example, a contract drafted in French and English
texts which contains only a choice of law clause designating the law
of France as applicable. If a conflict of interpretation arose, would
the French text be regarded as controlling? Presumably a French
court would say it was, but would an American court do so?"8
Would a French court regard the choice of law clause as consenting
to the jurisdiction of the French courts, so as to justify the acquisi-
tion of personal jurisdiction without service of process?
Or take the case of a contract consenting to the jurisdiction of
a foreign court, but without further provision for the other problems.
Does such a consent dispense with the necessity for notice to the
defendant, even if it is clear that formal service of process would
not be required? Would a foreign judgment rendered without such
notice be enforceable in the United States? 9 Would either an Amer-
ican or the foreign court assume that the consent to jurisdiction of
the foreign court contained by implication an adoption of that for-
eign law? To what extent may a consent to jurisdiction, especially
if coupled with a choice of law clause looking to the law of the
same country, be regarded as a designation of the courts of that
country as exclusively competent? To what extent should the desig-
nation of a particular forum as exclusively competent be regarded
as a choice of law2 or as consenting to jurisdiction of that forum
without formal service? To what extent does a controlling text
clause imply a selection of forum or a choice of law?21
These questions could be multiplied, not only to show the rela-
tionship between individual clauses but to demonstrate the varying
impact which different combinations of clauses may have. When
one adds the complication that the courts of different countries hold
a variety of attitudes not only about party autonomy as a single
concept but also about different aspects of party autonomy, the
possibilities for unforeseen results from "partial drafting" become
very complex indeed.
The present writer willingly confesses to preference for the
codification or legislative view of drafting - which basically means
putting just about everything into an important contract which the
drafter can get past opposing counsel and his own client. But it
should be emphasized that the problems raised above apply not
only to the codifier but also to the incorporator by reference. In fact,
18 Cf. Folsom, supra note 17, at 51.
19 See note 16 supra.
20 See Van Hecke, supra note 6, at 46.
21 See Folsom, supra note 17, at 51.
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in many situations they apply with special force to the latter because
the balance of the contract affords fewer clues to the resolution of
disputes in his case than in that of the codifier. It should also be
pointed out that these problems are not avoided by the lawyer who
engages in "partial drafting" intentionally, who, typically, includes
a choice of law clause but consciously avoids jurisdiction clauses."
If his intention is to keep the issues of interpretation and enforce-
ment fluid and uncertain, of course, then that is an end to the matter,
although one may wonder why in that state of affairs he bothered
with a choice of law clause. But if he supposes that his choice of
law clause alone either solves the other problems by implication,
or that it is somehow exempt from consideration by a tribunal con-
fronted with the jurisdictional issues, then he may be brought to a
rude awakening.
The moral to be derived from all of this is a rather obvious
one. At least to the extent one can assume the primary purpose of
contract drafting is the avoidance of uncertainty, then all of the
problems of choice of law and forum should be dealt with expressly.
If it is intended that permissible inferences about the resolution of
one such problem should not be drawn from express provision for
another problem, then that too should be stated expressly. In either
case the successful draftsman is normally the one who not only
foresaw the possibility of litigation but was also able to forestall it
by his advance identification of the rules that were to govern the
transaction. Because choice of law and forum comprise not a single
problem but a complex of problems, these suggestions therefore also
transcend other differences in drafting philosophy.
These comments do not, of course, tell us very much about
which law or which forum to choose, and it is doubtful whether
that choice ought ever to be made in the abstract. Some lawyers
prefer always to designate their own law as applicable and their
own courts as forum, and when two such lawyers from different
countries face each other across the negotiating table the result is
apt to be a test of bargaining strength or no provision for the prob-
lems at all. Other lawyers may be inclined to avoid the problem
of such a "home team" influence by choosing both a neutral forum
and a neutral law, but there is great danger in this choice because
many courts, especially in the United States23 but also in Europe, 4
refuse to permit party autonomy in these matters in the absence of
22 There may, of course, be perfectly valid reasons for avoiding choice of forum clauses.
See Folsom, supra note 17, at 55.
23 See Ynterna, Autonomy in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 341 (1952). But cf.
A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 469 (1962).
24 See Lagergren, supra note 4, at 214-15.
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a "reasonable relation" between the transaction and the forum or
law selected.
There is never any really adequate substitute for knowledge of
the alternative effects which would be produced by the choice of
particular systems or forums. Unfortunately, except for the special
knowledge of a foreign system which a draftsman may happen to
have, or except as the existence of especially advantageous rules
may come to light in the process of negotiation, the obstacles to
comprehensive research in the law of a foreign system are simply
too great to permit much of this sort of weighing of alternatives.2
There is, however, one rule of thumb that has much to recommend
it. If the weighing of alternative effects is not possible, then the
principal advantage of choice of law for the international contract
is the identification of the rules to be applied, whatever they may
prove to be. In the event that a dispute does arise, such a clear
identification of applicable rules is most apt to permit negotiation
and settlement without litigation. It follows, therefore, that any
choice of law or forum should be one likely to be observed and
enforced by the courts of both parties. This, of course, is the pri-
mary reason for avoiding the choice of neutral law and neutral
forum, because the chances are fairly high that such party autonomy
will not be permitted and that the benefits of any choice at all are
therefore endangered. If the highest obtainable degree of certainty
in the selection of applicable law is to be the objective, however,
this rule of thumb would go beyond the minimum assurance result-
ing from selection of a system with a "reasonable relation" to the
transaction. It would suggest, in addition, the selection of a system
to which the otherwise applicable choice of law rules of the parties'
own systems might reasonably be expected to lead.26 This does not
mean that choice of law can safely be left to choice of law rules
and ignored in drafting, but rather that uncertainties in the appli-
cation of conflict of law rules can be avoided while at the same time
obtaining the most favorable possible climate for the recognition
of party autonomy.
The scope of the present article does not permit discussion of
a number of other factors which bear upon these problems, such as
the desirability of compliance with the formality requirements in all
potentially applicable systems,2 the juggling of place of perform-
2 Cf. Brumbaugh, Choice-of-Law Provisions in Licensing Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL
SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 36 '(1962).
26 It is interesting to compare this rule of thumb with the suggestion that choice of law
should always designate the place of performance. Folsom, supra note 17, at 55. The
latter rule appears to be more nearly an illustration of the approach suggested here,
rather than a departure from it.
27 See Maw, supra note 9, at 27-28.
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ance or other contacts as a method of influencing the selection of
the applicable law,28 or the impact of mandatory rules of law of a
forum on the whole complex of autonomy problems.29 Another
vital area which must here be left untouched is the potential en-
forceability of a judgment once obtained, whether it be an Ameri-
can judgment exported for enforcement abroad80 or a foreign judg-
ment presented for enforcement in the United States.8 ' What has
been said, however, is perhaps enough to suggest that choice of law
and forum clauses, while not foolproof, are useful enough devices
to deserve thorough rather than matter of course drafting in the
preparation of international contracts.
28 See Maw, supra note 9, at 28-30. But cf. Folsom, supra note 17, at 54.
29 See Battifol, Public Policy and the Autonomy of the Parties: Interrelations Between
Imperative Legislation and the Doctrine of Party Autonomy, in INSTITUTE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 68-81 (Univ. of Mich. 1949).
30 See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367 (1963) ; Kulzer, Some
Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judgments: A Comparative Study, 16 BUFF. L.
REV. 84 (1966); Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American judgments Abroad, 29
YALE L.J. 188 '(1919) ; Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-
Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 72 (1964).
31 See Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291
(1963); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950) ; Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 44 (1962). For an exhaustive appendix of
the reported cases in this country involving foreign judgments see C. PETERSON, DIE
ANERKENNUNG AuSLAENDISCHER URTEILE IM AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT 107-27
(1964).
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